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The Next Step for Players at Academic
Institutions: Employees Status and Collective
Bargaining
SPORTS LAW
BY DANIEL WACHENFELD /ON NOVEMBER 1, 2021
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Players at academic institutions have found themselves on a winning streak lately. The flurry
of athlete-friendly developments in the world of college athletics dates back to September 30,
2019, when the California Legislature passed a bill prohibiting schools from punishing athletes
who accept endorsement money while in college.1 The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) labeled this legislation an existential threat to college athletics when it was introduced
months earlier.2 Not long after, Florida passed its own law allowing college athletes to profit
off of their name, image, and likeness (NIL).3 On June 21, 2021, the Supreme Court weighed in
on the college athletics debate with their holding in NCAA v. Alston.4 The Court unanimously
found that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act by limiting athletes’ education-related
benefits, but left the rest of the NCAA’s compensation limits in place.5 Justice Kavanaugh
wrote separately to emphasize that the NCAA’s remaining compensation restrictions also raise
serious questions under antitrust laws.6 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Alston, and in

the face of mounting pressure from state NIL laws, the NCAA suspended its own rules barring
players at academic institutions from profiting off of their names, images, and likenesses. 7
The players’ latest victory has come in the form of a memorandum released on September 29,
2021 by Jennifer Abruzzo, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. In the
memo, Abruzzo asserts that some players at academic institutions are employees under the
National Labor Relations Act.8 Abruzzo also declares the term “student-athlete” as a
misclassification, and indicates that she will pursue an independent violation of Section
8(a)(1)9 where an employer misclassifies players at academic institutions as “studentathletes.”10 The memo revisits Northwestern University,11 which produced the findings: (1) the
athletes perform a service for the universities and the NCAA; (2) the athletes are compensated
for that service with scholarships covering tuition, room and board, and meal plans (3) the
NCAA controls the players’ terms and conditions of employment, including maximum number
of practice and competition hours, scholarship eligibility, limits on compensation, and
minimum grade point average; and (4) the university controls the manner and means of the
athletes’ work on the field, and various facets of their daily lives.12 These findings, Abruzzo
asserts, clearly satisfy the definition of employee found in Section 2(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).13
The memo also cites “significant developments in the law, NCAA regulations, and the societal
landscape” as indications that the traditional notion of players at academic institutions as
amateurs is shifting.14 In the wake of Alston, commentators theorized that as the courts
continue to chip away at the NCAA’s limits on compensation, players at academic institutions
will be brought more closely within employee status under the law.15 Moreover, Abruzzo
argues that the players’ newfound “freedom to engage in far-reaching and lucrative business
enterprises” makes them more akin to professional athletes than amateurs.16 Finally, Abruzzo
cites the players’ recent activism with respect to racial justice as well as health and safety
concerns in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. .17 Her memo asserts that such activism
directly concerns the terms and conditions of employment, and is protected concerted
activity.18
One of the most interesting aspects of Abruzzo’s memo is the implication that players at
academic institutions could soon be unionizing. Taking Abruzzo’s finding that the players are
becoming more like employees as true, they would have the right, under Section 7 of the
NLRA “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”19 Collective bargaining
and players’ unions are hallmarks of professional sports, with each league having its own
Players’ Association. This is a fate the NCAA has been trying to avoid for a long time. 20 The
NCAA contends that amateurism plays a direct role in consumer demand. 21 In particular, the
NCAA feels that its compensation limits, and the players’ non-employee status, are essential
to differentiating their product from professional sports.22 However, the California Northern

District Court found that the NCAA’s compensation rules have no connection with consumer
demand for college sports.23 In fact, the players at academic institutions introduced evidence
that, despite the increase in new types of compensation allowed for players, consumer
demand for college sports has actually increased over the years.24 The Court concluded that
“whatever understanding consumers have of amateurism, they enjoy watching sports played
by student-athletes who receive compensation and benefits such as these, because this
compensation has been paid and increased while college athletics has become and remains
exceedingly popular and revenue-producing.”25
Overall, it seems that the NCAA is quickly losing its grasp on the athlete compensation limits
that have been its bread and butter for decades. Courts, lawyers, and legislators are no longer
buying the argument that limits on athlete compensation somehow preserve the integrity of
college sports, or make up some quintessential component of the product. The NCAA’s
compensation limits have been eroding away, and Jennifer Abruzzo’s memo may signal that
the final blow is coming. If players at academic institutions really are employees, then they’ll
be able to form a players’ union, under Section 7 of the NLRA, akin to those that exist for the
MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL and bargain collectively, wielding much more power and influence
than they ever have before.
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